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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over final orders of the Third District Court
under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-103(3).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE #1: Did Judge Quinn misinterpret the remand directive contained in
McLaughlin v. Schenk, 2009 UT 64, ^ 38 when he granted the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment Regarding Fairness of the 2005 Waivers? Was the Appellant Sam
McLaughlin entitled to a fairness hearing under that directive, or did Judge Quinn and
Cookietree have discretion to proceed under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-852 and 853?
Standard of review with authority: The mandate of an appellate court binds the
district court and the parties and affords the district court no discretion whether to comply
with that mandate. Utah Dep V of Transportation v. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, ^[8, 208 P.3d 583;
IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & KMgmt, Inc., 2008 UT 73, \ 28, 196 P.3d 588.
Consequently, because the mandate is a legal determination, reviewing whether a district
court complied with the mandate presents a question of law, which is reviewed for
correctness. See Amax Magnesium Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 874 P.2d 840, 842 (Utah
1994); Slattery v. Covey & Co., 909 P.2d 925, 927 (Utah Ct.App. 1995).
Preserved in the Record Below: R2135-2137, R2996-2998, R3485-3487.
ISSUE #2: Was Judge Hilder's 10/26/10 Ruling and Order (granting Plaintiffs
01/14/10 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and/or Declaratory Judgment and
denying Defendants' 2/22/10 Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and holding Plaintiff

1
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was entitled to a fairness hearing) the law of the case, and was it thus improperly
reconsidered by Judge Quinn?
Standard of review with authority: f,[T]he application of the law of the case
doctrine . . . is ordinarily reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.11 In re Adoption
o/A.F.K., 2009 UT App. 198, f 15, 216 P.3d 980; In re E.H., 2006 UT 36, % 32, 137 P.3d
809. However, f,[w]hen a legal question is presented to an appellate court in law-of-thecase packaging," id, the abuse of discretion standard must yield to the correctness
standard of review. See id. f 33 ("We can identify no reason why an erroneous legal
determination should be afforded greater discretion on appeal merely because it wears the
garb of law of the case. For purposes of review, then, considerations of law of the case
must yield to those of the substance of the underlying ruling when ascertaining the proper
standard of review."). A.F.K., 2009 UT App. 198, f 15.
Preserved in the Record Below: R3017-3018.
ISSUE #3: The McLaughlin opinion held that shareholders in closely held
corporations owe the other shareholders fiduciary obligations, which is a strict good faith
standard of utmost good faith and loyalty. McLaughlin v. Schenk, 2009 UT 64, f 18, 23.
Did the post-remand corporate action, designed to deprive McLaughlin of a hard-won
right to a fairness hearing, violate this strict good faith standard?
Standard of review with authority: When "reviewing a district court's grant of
summary judgment, the facts and all reasonable inferences are reviewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, here Appellant McLaughlin." Id. f 14. Underlying
determinations, legal questions, such as the scope of a shareholder's fiduciary duty and
2
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the validity of share transfers under the shareholder agreement, are reviewed for
correctness. Id.
Preserved in the Record Below: R1825, R3003-3004, R3502, p. 9-10, R3503, p.
13-14,22.
ISSUE #4: The district court found that the Board and shareholder post-remand
waivers complied with the framework for resolving nontransaction related conflict
situations and completely resolved Greg Schenk's conflict of interest vis-a-vis the 2005
Waivers. Was this a proper ruling as a matter of law when: (a) Greg Schenk again
participated; (b) there was not a qualified Board; and (c) there were disputes of material
fact relating to the adequacy of the disclosures, information made available and
knowledge held by the allegedly disinterested Board member prior to those corporate
actions?
Standard of review with authority: See Standard of Review for Issue #3, above.
Preserved in the Record Below: R1823-1825, R2137-2144, R2962-2963,
R2978-2982, R3011-3014, R3487.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Not applicable.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case,
Within weeks of this Court's decision in McLaughlin v. Schenk, 2009 UT 64; 220
P.3d 146 (herein "the Opinion" or McLaughlin I), Cookietree, Inc. and Schenk embarked
upon a course of conduct designed to thwart the specific language of ^ 38 of the Opinion
3
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and avoid, at all costs, the fairness hearing dictated by this Court. McLaughlin and Judge
Hilder read the remand directive and found in it a clear mandate. Cookietree / Schenk
and Judge Quinn read the remand directive as allowing alternative courses of action. As
demonstrated herein, the remand directive specifically required a fairness hearing,
because any shareholder vote must (and did) include Greg Schenk. Since he is the
majority shareholder, President of the Board, and has heightened duties to McLaughlin
whether he wears his "shareholder hat" or his "director hat" the only way to resolve the
fairness of the 2005 Waivers is through judicial action under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a851. McLaughlin 1^3%.
Course of Proceedings.
1.

McLaughlin I was decided on October 2, 2009. R1758 Paragraph 38 of the

Opinion contained a remand directive: "We therefore remand for a determination of
whether the [2005] waivers were fair within the meaning of Utah Code section 16-10a851, which is a fact-intensive inquiry focusing on whether the waivers were beneficial to
the corporation and the shareholders and whether they satisfied the standard of fair
dealing." (hereinafter "remand directive").
2.

Remittur was accomplished on November 10, 2009. R1779.

3.

On December 18, 2009, a Board meeting was held. R1829.

4.

On January 6, 2010, a Shareholder meeting was held. R1835.

5.

On the basis of actions and resolutions at those two meetings, McLaughlin

immediately filed a Motion for Partial Summary and/or Declaratory Judgment Declaring
the Invalidity of Corporate Actions. R1876. The Motion was brought under Utah Code
4
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Ann. § 16-10a-824(3), the company's bylaws, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-401 and Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(a). R1877.
6.

The Motion argued, among other things, that the corporate actions taken on

December 18, 2009 and January 6, 2010 were improperly undertaken for the specific
purpose of circumventing the remand directive. R1824.
7.

In response Cookietree and Greg Schenk, collectively, filed a Cross Motion

for Summary Judgment. R1882. Cookietree and Schenk argued that the Opinion
"remanded for further action to resolve the conflict of interest" (R1884) and asked Judge
Hilder to recognize the December 12, 2009 and January 6, 2010 corporate actions as
valid and effective to (again) waive the 1991 and 1999 stock transfer provisions and
ratify the 2005 Waivers. R1887-1921.
8.

Judge Hilder, noting "the Supreme Court's remand appears to be

unequivocal" (R2372) and citing Gildea v. Guardian Tide Co., 2001 UT 75; ^ 19; 31
P.3d 543 and IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D&KManagement, Inc., 2008 UT 73, \ 28;
196 P.3d 588 ruled that "in this case the parties and the courts are bound by the mandate
on remand." R2374. Judge Hilder denied Cookietree and Schenk's Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment and granted McLaughlin's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
ruling that McLaughlin "is entitled to the fairness hearing identified by the Supreme
Court." R2374.
9.

Cookietree and Schenk petitioned the Utah Supreme Court to appeal

interlocutorily from Judge Hilder's ruling. R2377. That Petition was denied. R2383.

5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10.

At a subsequent Rule 16 Conference set for the purpose of scheduling a

trial and obtaining clarification on procedure for a fairness hearing, Judge Hilder
announced to the parties that he was retiring and that the case would be reassigned to
Judge Quinn. R3501,p. 2-3, 10.
11.

Judge Quinn soon held a status conference with the parties on May 17,

2011. Judge Quinn announced "Fm certainly not going to take the same position that
Judge Hilder did. The efforts to remedy what took place in 2005 have no effect on what
ultimately happens in this case because Fm not convinced that's the case. I think that the
corporation can try and fix it. Whether they've effectively fixed it or not, I don't know,
but I think that they can. . . . So why don't we invite [Cookietree and Schenk] to file a
motion for summary judgment that addresses all of those issues.... Then I think I'd be in
a better position to determine if there is any additional hearings necessary." R3502, p.
11.
12.

Cookietree and Schenk then filed (another) Motion for Summary Judgment

Regarding Fairness of 2005 Waivers. R2705. This Motion again argued that the
December 18, 2009 and January 6, 2010 post-remand corporate actions "cured" any
defect in the 2005 Waivers. R2707. The Motion also argued that the 2005 Waivers were
fair as a matter of law, based upon allegedly undisputed facts. R2707.
13.

McLaughlin defended by arguing that "fairness" by its nature is a fact-

intensive inquiry (R2989 and Opinion, f 38) and demonstrating the existence of questions
of material fact pertaining to fairness. R2950-2989. McLaughlin also made the
following arguments to Judge Quinn:
6
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a.

Judge Hilder's denial of the Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment

(paragraph 8 above) and refusal to recognize the post-remand corporate action was law of
the case. R3017. Considerable time and expense went into briefing and defending
against the December 18, 2009 and January 6, 2010 corporate action the first time.
R3017. McLaughlin asked Judge Quinn, given the absence of manifest injustice, change
of controlling authority or new evidence, to decline to reconsider Judge Hilder's ruling.
R3017-3018.
b.

The mandate rule binds Judge Quinn and the parties. R2991, R3503,

p. 6, 13-14. Not only are the district court and the parties bound by the remand directive
(Opinion ^38) but they are bound by other pronouncements in the Opinion:
"At the time th[e 1999 Stock Transfer] was made, it violated the 1991
Shareholder Agreement. McLaughlin /, ^f 6.
"[C]lose corporation shareholders [owe] all the same duties owed by
partners - utmost good faith and loyalty to all shareholders of the
corporation. Compared to the fiduciary duty owed by directors and
stockholders of public corporations . . . this duty [is] 'more rigorous' than
the 'somewhat less stringent5 corporate duty of good faith and inherent
fairness." Id. at 18 (and expressly adopted in ^ 22).
"[Stockholders in close corporations must discharge their management and
stockholder responsibilities in conformity with this strict good faith
standard. They may not act out of avarice, expediency or self-interest in
derogation of their duty of loyalty to the other stockholders and to the
corporation." Id.
With this holding, the Utah Supreme Court recognized "alternative
remedies [] for oppressed shareholders" including equitable remedies and
relief. Id. at^f 22 and fn. 4.
"The transfer of shares from Anna Schenk to Greg Schenk did not conform
to the first right of refusal provision; therefore it was void unless the

7
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waivers by the Board and three of Cookietree's shareholders were valid.
A/.atf31.
"[T]he [2005] waivers ratifying the 1999 share transfer were tainted by a
conflict of interest because they were both executed by Greg Schenk, who
clearly had an economic interest in waiving the share transfer restrictions of
the shareholder agreement that were ignored when he received the shares
by which he gained majority control of Cookietree." Id. at f 38.
"By waiving the restrictions on the share transfers, Schenk and the other
board members and voting shareholders deprived the company and the
nonvoting shareholders of the economic opportunity to increase their
investment in the corporation. Id.
We therefore remand for a determination of whether the waivers were fair
within the meaning of Utah Code section 16-10a-851, which is a fact
intensive inquiry focusing on whether the waivers were beneficial to the
corporation and the shareholders and whether they satisfied the standard of
fair dealing. " Id.
R2992-2993.
c.

The post-remand corporate action did not cure anything. The new

waivers and ratifications were tainted by the same problem as the 2005 Waivers: the
participation of Greg Schenk. R3011-3014, R3503, p. 6 lines 9-1L
14.

Judge Quinn ruled from the bench at oral argument. While he properly

found that "fairness" of the 2005 Waivers was a question of fact for which summary
judgment was not appropriate (R3503, p. 4 lines 7-12) he went on to rule that the postremand corporate action "completely resolvefd] any issue concerning the conflict of
interest that was found to have tainted the original waivers." R3503, p. 4 line 23 - p. 5
line 11. Specifically, Judge Quinn reasoned:
a.

The Opinion "set aside or reserved the issue or remanded the issue

of the 2005 [Waivers] because they were tainted by a conflict of interest, and in doing so
8
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the Supreme Court advised as its template the conflict of interest approach for conflict of
interest transactions that's in 16-10A-851 should be the template for resolving this."
R3503, p. 3 lines 2-7.
b.

"They also explicitly remanded for a fairness issue . . . " R3503, p. 3

c.

"The question can be fairly raised in light of the fact that that remand

line 8.

instruction was explicit. Do I have any discretion at all to consider the other two
possibilities that are set forth in the statute, one of which is director's action by qualified
directors, the other which - other of which is shareholder's action. I think that I do."
R3503, p. 3 lines 14-19.
d.

"I don't think that in making [the remand directive] the Supreme

Court intended to foreclose the possibility that the transaction could be addressed under
the other two subsections [of 16-10a-851]." R3503, p. 4 lines 2-5.
e.

"I know Judge Hilder thought differently about that, but that's what I

think." R3503, p. 4 lines 5-6.
Disposition in Court Below.
Judge Quinn revisited the 10/26/10 order of Judge Hilder applying the mandate
rule, interpreted the remand directive as giving him and Cookietree/Schenk "discretion"
(R3503, p. 3 line 16) and ruled that the post-remand waivers and ratification were
effective as a matter of law to "cure" the violations of the 1991 and 1999 shareholders
agreement whereby Greg Schenk personally obtained 545,200 additional shares of
Cookietree stock to the detriment of Sam McLaughlin. A copy of the written 11/17/11
9
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Ruling and Order prepared by Cookietree/Schenk and signed by Judge Quinn is attached
as Addendum "A." R3480-3488.
Statement of Relevant Facts.
The Disputed Stock Transfer and McLaughlin L
1.

Greg Schenk is the majority shareholder and President of the Board of

Cookietree, Inc. Sam McLaughlin is a minority shareholder and former executive
employee of Cookietree, Inc. R1818.
2.

In 2004 Sam McLaughlin sued Greg Schenk for breach of a Shareholders

Agreement which governed the sale and transfer of stock in Cookietree, Inc. The transfer
at issue was the sale of 545,200 shares of stock to Greg Schenk from his father's widow,
Anna Schenk, in 1998 ("the disputed stock transfer"). Rl-25.
3.

McLaughlin alleged that the disputed stock transfer violated the

Shareholders Agreement's express provisions. R8-10. The transfer gave Greg Schenk
majority control of Cookietree, Inc. McLaughlin 7, f 38. Had Greg Schenk followed the
Shareholder's Agreement, McLaughlin would have been given the opportunity to
purchase a portion of the 545,200 shares.
4.

In 2005 Cookietree's Board, including Greg Schenk and his wife, and three

shareholders including Greg Schenk, voted to waive the provisions of the applicable
Shareholders Agreement that precluded the stock transfer ("the 2005 Waivers"). R227228, R3481. Also, certain of Cookietree, Inc.'s shareholders, including Greg Schenk,
voted to waive the stock transfer provisions. R230-235, R3481-3482.
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5.

The district court granted summary judgment on the 2005 Waivers

(R1735), McLaughlin appealed to the Utah Supreme Court (R1739) and McLaughlin I
was issued.
6.

McLaughlin I held the 2005 Waivers, through Greg Schenk's participation,

were tainted with conflict of interest. McLaughlin I ^ 38. "We therefore remand for a
determination of whether the [2005 W]aivers were fair within the meaning of Utah Code
Ann. § 16-10a-851, which is a fact-intensive inquiry focusing on whether the waivers
were beneficial to the corporation and the shareholders and whether they satisfied the
standard of fair dealing." Id.
Post Remand Corporate Action
7.

Within weeks of the Opinion, on December 18, 2009, and at the request of

Greg Schenk, the Board met. Rl829-1833. All three (3) Board members were present,
constituting a quorum. Id. Greg Schenk is still a member of the Board.
8.

Unlike in 2005, Schenk and Rosemann disqualified themselves for conflict

of interest. Id. The remaining "disinterested" Board member, David Rudd, alone voted
to ratify the 2005 Board waiver and "presently waived the stock transfer provisions in the
Shareholders Agreement." R3484. All three Board members then voted to ratify these
actions of Rudd. Id. Rudd also authorized the same actions, in the form of Proposal 1
(present waiver of the stock transfer provisions) and Proposal 2 (ratification of 2005
Waivers and Proposal 1) to be submitted to the shareholders for vote at the upcoming
annual meeting on January 6, 2010. Id.

11
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9.

At the shareholder meeting, all shareholders appeared by voting proxy, with

the exception of Greg Schenk and Harold Rosemann who were present personally. At
the meeting, a majority of shareholders (including Greg Schenk and Harold Rosemann)
voted for Proposal 1. R3485, % 15. A majority of shareholders (not including Greg
Schenk but including Harold Rosemann) voted for Proposal 2. Id. at f 9.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The remand directive in this case was specific and unambiguous. McLaughlin I
found that the Shareholders Agreements did not anticipate the situation presented by the
disputed stock transfer. Therefore, it remanded for a determination of whether the 2005
Waivers were fair within the meaning of Section 851. Judge Quinn misinterpreted the
remand directive and violated the mandate rule when he found he had discretion to allow
other ways to " fix it.11
McLaughlin successfully convinced Judge Hilder of this and a fairness hearing in
accord with the remand directive was ordered on October 26, 2010. This order, after
briefing, discovery and argument, became law of the case. Judge Quinn should not, upon
inheriting the case in this posture, have invited and granted a new motion on the same
basis.
Cookietree and Schenk's post-remand action in immediately conceiving, procuring
and seeking to enforce new ratifications and waivers, which all included the participation
of Greg Schenk, violated the duty of utmost good faith and fair dealing this Court
imposed upon shareholders in close corporations by its holding in McLaughlin I Judge
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Quinn erred when he found the situation had been "cured11 and that there were no material
issues of fact surrounding the new corporate action.
Lastly, it was inappropriate to grant summary judgment on the basis of the postremand corporate action. The same taint, Greg Schenk, infects the post-remand action.
There are material issues of fact surrounding the adequacy of the disclosures made to the
"sole disinterested director" and to the shareholder group. The Board action was
ineffective because it was not the action of a majority of the directors present.
ARGUMENT
L

THE MANDATE RULE REQUIRED UNWAVERING FIDELITY
TO THE REMAND DIRECTIVE IN f 38.

McLaughlin I remanded a three-part question: (1) Were the 2005 Waivers fair
within the meaning of Section 851? Id, (2) Were the [2005 W]aivers beneficial to the
corporation and its shareholders? Id. (3) Did the [2005 W]aivers satisfy the standard of
fair dealing? Id, McLaughlin I called the remand directive a "fact-intensive inquiry." Id,
Cookietree and Schenk sought to avoid the remand directive when they contrived,
procured and sought to enforce the new, post-remand corporate action. Judge Quinn
thereafter departed from the remand directive when he refused to hold a fairness hearing,
instead granting summary judgment on the basis of thait action. This Court should not
tolerate the intentional thwarting and frustration of its express directive and should
reverse the 11/17/11 Order.
The mandate rule dictates that pronouncements of an appellate court on legal
issues in a case become the law of the case and must be followed in subsequent
13
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proceedings of that case. "The mandate rule binds both the district court and the parties
to honor the mandate of the appellate court." Utah Dep't of Transportation v. Ivers, 2009
UT 56, % 12, 218 P.3d 583. "The lower court must implement both the letter and the
spirit of the mandate, taking into account the appellate court's opinion and the
circumstances it embraces." Id. In proceedings on remand, an "unwavering fidelity to
the letter and spirit of the mandate" is required. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 2004 UT 34, \ 5, 98 P.3d 409.
Error occurred when the district court found that the remand directive instructs
"the trial court and n o t . . . the parties." See 10/18/11 Tr. p. 3 lines 23-24. Error further
occurred when the district court decided he had "discretion" to consider the other two
possibilities that are set forth in" Sections 852 and 853. R3503, p. 3 lines 14-19.
Ivers held that both the letter and the spirit of an appellate court's opinion must be
observed, along with "the circumstances it embraces." The Opinion found that
McLaughlin had been damaged and unequivocally recognized the appropriateness of
equitable relief to address those damages if the 2005 Waivers were not fair. Id. f 38 and
fn 4. McLaughlin was denied his opportunity to have a fairness hearing and to prove
damages.
II.

JUDGE HILDER'S 10/18/10 RULING AND ORDER WAS LAW OF
THE CASE; JUDGE QUINN SHOULD NOT HAVE
REOPENED THE ISSUE.

McLaughlin initially defeated Cookietree's attempt at summary judgment
following a nine-month-long effort at briefing, discovery and cross-briefing. R18152371. Litigation procedures are enormously expensive for individuals. After oral
14
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argument, Judge Hilder (correctly) interpreted the remand directive and declined to
enforce the post-remand corporate action.
Sua sponte, when Judge Quinn inherited the case, he indicated that he thought
Cookietree and Schenk could "fix i f and invited another dispositive motion.
McLaughlin respectfully asked Judge Quinn not to reconsider the 10/18/10 Ruling and
Order under the "law of the case" doctrine. R3017-3018. When a legal "decision [is]
made on an issue during one stage of the case," that decision "is binding in successive
stages of the same litigation." Particularly when an appellate court makes a
pronouncement on a legal issue, "[t]he lower court must not depart from the
mandate . . . . " This is true even if the lower court "believe[s] that the issue could have
been better decided in another fashion." Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51,
T| 67, 82 P3d 1076 (alterations in original) (quoting Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892
P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (Utah 1995).
Further, there were no exceptions to the law of the case doctrine to justify the
exercise of discretion by Judge Quinn. Under IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D&K
Management, Inc., 2008 UT 73, 196 P.3d 588, ^| 34 three exceptional circumstances
could justify departure from the law of the case doctrine: "(1) when there has been an
intervening change of controlling authority; (2) when new evidence has become
available; or (3) when the court is convinced that its prior decision was clearly erroneous
and would work a manifest injustice." The Court did not find, nor did Cookietree or
Schenk even argue, the presence of any three of these exceptions. R3341-3342.

15
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III.

THE POST-REMAND CORPORATE ACTION VIOLATED THE
DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
ENUNCIATED AND IMPOSED IN MCLAUGHLINI.

Cookietree and Schenk were and are bound by the holdings of McLaughlin I

"At

the time th[e 1999 Stock Transfer] was made, it violated the 1991 Shareholder
Agreement. McLaughlin I, f 6. "[C]lose corporation shareholders [owe] all the same
duties owed by partners - utmost good faith and loyalty to all shareholders of the
corporation. Compared to the fiduciary duty owed by directors and stockholders of
public corporations . . . this duty [is] 'more rigorous' than the 'somewhat less stringent'
corporate duty of good faith and inherent fairness." Id. at 18 (and expressly adopted in
Tf 22). "[Stockholders in close corporations must discharge their management and
stockholder responsibilities in conformity with this strict good faith standard. They may
not act out of avarice, expediency or self-interest in derogation of their duty of loyalty to
the other stockholders and to the corporation." Id. (emphasis added). With this holding,
the Utah Supreme Court recognized "alternative remedies [] for oppressed shareholders"
including equitable remedies and relief. Id. at f 22 and fn. 4.
"The transfer of shares from Anna Schenk to Greg Schenk did not conform to the
first right of refusal provision; therefore it was void unless the [2005] waivers by the
Board and three of Cookietree's shareholders were valid. Id. at f 31. "The waivers
ratifying the 1999 share transfer were tainted by a conflict of interest because they were
both executed by Greg Schenk, who clearly had an economic interest in waiving the
share transfer restrictions of the shareholder agreement that were ignored when he
received the shares by which he gained majority control of Cookietree." Id. at <J 38.
16
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"By waiving the restrictions on the share transfers, Schenk and the other board members
and voting shareholders deprived the company and the nonvoting shareholders of the
economic opportunity to increase their investment in the corporation. Id. Cookietree's
Shareholder's Agreement did not anticipate or foresee a situation such as this. "We
therefore remand for a determination of whether the waivers were fair within the meaning
of Utah Code section 16-10a-851, which is a fact intensive inquiry focusing on whether
the waivers were beneficial to the corporation and the shareholders and whether they
satisfied the standard of fair dealing. " Id.
The "letter and spirit" of the Opinion must be taken as a whole; Cookietree's/
Schenk5 s counsel only read the first sentence off 37 when they devised the post-remand
corporate action. Therefore, in the fifth year of this litigation, Schenk, his lawyers and
the company he controls, Cookietree, Inc., embarked upon a course of conduct designed
to deprive Sam McLaughlin of the fairness hearing directed by this Court.1 The efforts to
deprive their fellow shareholder of an appellate mandate were in bad faith and of
themselves constitute a violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing articulated in
the McLaughlin I holding.

1

Usually a minority shareholder would be economically barred from continually fighting
such tactics as these. McLaughlin is fighting a goliath. Cookietree has not only aided
and promoted Schenkfs cause, but they have paid his attorneys' fees and costs as well.
R3001. Here, McLaughlin believes so strongly in his evidence he has fought for eight
years and two appeals for the opportunity to present the facts and circumstances of the
disputed stock transfer to a fact finder. This Court should honor and allow that
opportunity.

17
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Within weeks of remand, Cookietree's/Schenk's counsel prepared a "disclosure
document" which described] the facts and circumstances surrounding the 2005 Board
Waiver and the issues associated with authorizing a new waiver." which was
disseminated to and reviewed by the three members of the Board. R1830. Privilege was
asserted for this document, which was not produced in discovery and does not appear in
the record below. R2216-2217.
A set of Minutes, prepared by Cookietree's/Schenk's counsel, reveals a veritable
shell game of Board action, all discussed and conducted in 10 minutes time. R29782979. Three Board members were present and two disqualified themselves to avoid the
appearance of a conflict. R2978. The three Board members "determined to put the
matterfs]" of ratification and waiver before the "sole disinterested director." R1830.
That director, acting alone, then ratified the 2005 Board Waivers and presently waived
the stock transfer provisions for the disputed stock sale. R1830. The two disqualified
Board members then ratified that. Rl830-1831. The Board then resolved to put a
convoluted Proposal 1 and Proposal 2 to a vote by Shareholders. Id. Those shareholders,
which included the disqualified directors, then undertook a similar shell game of
ratification of past waivers, present waivers, ratification of ratification and present
waivers. R1985.

2

The record has been mis-paginated here. There are two R2978 and R2979. This
citation intends to refer to p. 29-30 of the document at issue.
3

This refers to p. 31.
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McLaughlin argued below that this conduct, designed for the sole purpose of
preventing McLaughlin from getting his fairness hearing, was a violation of the duty of
utmost good faith and fair dealing imposed by McLaughlin L The Court concluded that
"there is no material question of fact concerning the circumstances surrounding the
[post-remand corporate action] or the content of disclosures made to David Rudd and
the shareholders in connection therewith." R3487. It was error, in light of all the facts
and circumstances, to conclude that as a matter of law the duty was not violated in the
procurement of the post-remand corporate action.
IV,

THE POST-REMAND WAIVERS WERE NOT VALID
AND EFFECTIVE AS A MATTER OF LAW AND
IT WAS ERROR TO RULE THEY WERE.

Almost immediately after the issuance of the Opinion in October 2009, at the
request of Greg Schenk and with the assistance of litigation counsel, Cookietree initiated
action under Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-852 and 853. They prepared and then executed a
ratification of the 2005 Waivers and prepared new, present waivers of the disputed stock
transaction. For this strategy, Cookietree ignored the remand directive and focused only
on the first sentence of ^j 37 of the Opinion. Paragraph 38 of the Opinion, however,
remanded for a fact intensive fairness hearing under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-851. If
the fairness inquiry into the 2005 Waivers (in which Greg Schenk participated) is "factintensive" {McLaughlin I ^ 38) should not also the fairness of the post-remand waivers
(in which Greg Schenk participated) qualify as a question of fact? R3503. Judge Quinn
erred when he found the post-remand actions valid and effective as a matter of law.

19
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A.

Rule 24(a)(9) Statement.
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) McLaughlin here identifies challenged

findings of fact and marshals the record evidence supporting the finding.
"Prior to the meeting, David Rudd analyzed and reviewed documentation
containing all of the material facts concerning the Stock Sale and the 2005
Waivers." R3483, f 10.
Evidence supporting the finding: David Rudd discussed the proposed Board action with
litigation counsel. R29794, R3337. He reviewed the 2005 Waivers; he reviewed the
Shareholders' Agreements; he discussed the proposed Board action with the other
members of the Board; he reviewed the Disclosure Statement; and he reviewed
McLaughlin/. R2761. Mr. Rudd reviewed financial information. R3337. Mr. Rudd
testified that he considered factors, namely the Opinion and the disclosure statement, that
indicated the 2005 Waivers may not be fair. Id. At the post-remand meeting, the Board
discussed the 1999 stock sale, the 2005 Waivers and the Supreme Court's holding in
McLaughlin I that the 2005 Waivers were tainted because Greg Schenk had a conflict of
interest. R2733,f 48.
Evidence to challenge the finding: Mr. Rudd did not know and still does not
know material pieces of information which would allow him to evaluate the
circumstances and fairness of the disputed stock transfer. R2978:>-2982. For example, he

4

p. 30.

5

p. 31-35.
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does not know what consideration was paid for the disputed shares in 1999 or whether
the provisions in the Shareholders Agreement setting forth how shares were to be valued
were followed in 1999. R2978.6 He does not know how many shares Sam and Kim
McLaughlin (and by extension, other shareholders) would have been able to acquire in
1999, had they been given the opportunity or the value of those shares in 2010 compared
to 1999. Id.
David Rudd only knows one perspective (the one controlled by Greg Schenk and
his lawyers). R29787-2979. He has never talked to Anna Schenk, the seller of 545,200
shares. He has never talked to Sam McLaughlin, the shareholder who challenged the
transaction. Id. He has never talked to Greg Schenk, the buyer, about the transaction.
Id. He did, however, talk to litigation counsel and reviewed a (privileged) briefing/
disclosure document prepared by them prior to his vote. Id.
Significantly, Mr. Rudd held, and still holds, certain material and mistaken beliefs
of fact. R29798-2980. He incorrectly believes that, in 1999, Anna Schenk offered the
545,200 shares first to Cookietree and that Cookietree's Board and shareholders went
through a process of evaluating the respective rights of the company, and the shareholder
had obtained waivers, both on a board level and a shareholder's level, to the stock

6

p.31.

7

p. 31-32.

8

p. 32-33.
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transfer provisions and Mr. Schenk purchased the shares. In other words, Mr. Rudd
believes the Shareholder Agreement was followed in 1999. R2980.
Mr. Rudd believes the disputed stock transfer was fair to the shareholders in 1999
because it is fair now, in 2010. R2980. However, one of the factors Mr. Rudd believes
bears on fairness is the "contribution of people who run the business, who make the
business successful, who add certain benefits to the business." Id. Even so, Mr. Rudd
does not have any understanding as to whether McLaughlin was such an employee in
1999 (or in 2005 for that matter). Id. In fact, McLaughlin materially helped build
Cookietree into the successful business it is today. Id.
When confronted (apparently for the first time) with the true facts surrounding the
1999 stock transfer (i.e. that it was accomplished without the knowledge of the other
shareholders and without being recorded in the company's stock transfer ledger or in
contemporaneous Board minutes), Mr. Rudd stated that notice should have been given to
all shareholders for the transfer to be fair and proper. R2980. However, this was never
done.
Mr. Rudd believes that parties to a contract, like a shareholder's agreement, have
the right to expect that the contract's provisions are followed. R2981. Yet he voted to
waive the stock transfer provisions in the Shareholders Agreement.
The Disclosure Statement sent to the shareholders prior to the
post-remand meeting fully disclosed all material facts. R3484, f 14.
Evidence supporting the finding: The Disclosure Statement disclosed all material facts
concerning the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, the Transfer Restriction Provisions, the
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1999 Stock Sale, the 2005 Waivers, Greg Schenk's conflict of interest and the
circumstances surrounding this litigation, and the Supreme Court's McLaughlin I
decision. R2735.
Evidence to challenge the finding: There was no counter-opinion contained in the
Disclosure Statement. R2962. The document was drafted by litigation counsel and
therefore subject to a reasonable inference that it was advocacy, not information. Id. The
Disclosure Statement was single spaced, rambling and confusing to read. Id. There is a
question of fact about whether the lengthy Information Statement and the Minutes were
the result of a 10-minute Board meeting or simply rubber-stamped at that meeting.
R2962-2963.
The Disclosure Statement did not disclose other facts such as whether Greg
Schenk provided consideration for the 2005 Waivers or the post-remand waivers (R29682969), whether the waivers were the unilateral acts or the acts of counsel (R2968),
whether Harold Rosemann (Board member and shareholder) received consideration for
his complicity and facilitation (R2969, R2983-2984) and what the impact was. The
Disclosure Statement did not address the issue of good faith or the adequacy of the
disclosures made in the procurement of the 2005 Waivers and the numerous facts that
could be considered in support of that issue. R2972-2976.
B.

The Post-Remand Shareholder Action Cannot be Effective as a
Matter of Law,
The immutable problem with the post-remand action, or any waiver of the stock

transfer provisions under Cookietree's Shareholder Agreement, was articulated by
23Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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McLaughlin I. "The agreement [] provided that written consent from either the board of
directors or the owners of at least two-thirds of the shares (excluding the shares owned by
the selling shareholder) c[an] waive the agreement's restrictions on share transfers.''
McLaughlin I, f 5, 30. Because of the number of shares he owns, if Greg Schenk is
removed from the equation, it is not possible to obtain a two-thirds vote. R2807, R2971.
Additionally, Greg Schenk is President of the Board. Accordingly, McLaughlin I held
"[t]he agreement failed [] to foresee the possible conflicts presented when a buyer is
already a corporate shareholder and votes to waive the restrictions on share transfers."
1f38.
In justifying Greg Schenk5 s participation in the post-remand corporate action,
Cookietree acknowledged: "Greg Schenk voted on [2010] Proposal 1 because his vote
was necessary for waiver under the Shareholders' Agreements, as both Agreements
require a two-thirds approval for a waiver not including the share of the seller in the
transaction (i.e. the Boyd Schenk Shares).5' R1917. Greg Schenk, the person the Utah
Supreme Court found tainted the 2005 Waivers with a conflict of interest, was a
"necessary55 vote for the 2010 Waivers because of the provisions in the Shareholders
Agreements.
This statement is apropos of the holding in ^f 38: the Shareholders Agreements
require Greg Schenk to vote. He is the self-dealing director/shareholder. This situation is
not contemplated by the governing documents. The only way to resolve it is the remand
directive: a fairness hearing. Schenk5s conflict of interest is res judicata. McLaughlin /,
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^ 31, 38. Therefore, no vote of the shareholders could effectively waive the share transfer
provisions violated in 1999 during the disputed stock transfer.
Additionally and supplementally, there is a dispute of fact about the adequacy of
the disclosures made to shareholders in the form of Information Statement. See p. 20-23
above. If there is a question of fact about the adequacy of the information the
shareholders had prior to voting, the post-remand action cannot be legal and valid as a
matter of law.
C.

The Post-Remand Board Action Was Not Valid or Effective as a
Matter of Law.
1.

The 2009 Board Was Not Qualified,

Cookietree's Bylaws § 3.07 require that a quorum be present. Rl849-1873.
Section 3.08 (R1856) states that "the act of the majority of the directors present at a
meeting at which a quorum is present shall... be the act of the Board." This is in accord
with Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-824(3).
Since three (3) Board members were present for a quorum at the 12/18/09
meeting, the 12/18/09 acts, resolutions and recommendations could not have been "the
act of the majority of directors present" since only one (1) Board member voted. One of
three is not a majority. Therefore, the ratification of the 2005 Waivers made solely by
Rudd, the present waiver approved by Rudd, the recommendation to the shareholders in
favor of Proposal 1 and Proposal 2 made solely by Rudd, and the submission of Proposal
1 and Proposal 2 to the shareholders solely by Rudd are invalid as a matter of law. The
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district court erred when it held otherwise and recognized the post-remand corporate
action as effective.
2.

Even if the Board was Qualified, Disputes of Fact Regarding the
Adequacy and Fairness of Rudd's Information Preclude the Entry
of Summary Judgment on the Post-Remand Board Waiver.

When deposed, Mr. Rudd revealed a fundamental lack of understanding about the
disputed stock transfer itself, the circumstances of the 2005 Waivers and could not
articulate why the 2005 Waivers were fair. A copy of his entire deposition is contained
in the record at R2147-2251. Mr. Rudd is a very busy man; he is a practicing lawyer and
he sits on other boards for other companies (one other, in fact, with Greg Schenk). Mr.
Rudd made no effort to investigate or understand both sides of the disputed stock transfer
issue. He simply swallowed what Cookietree's counsel provided to him in the 10 minute
discussion at the Board Meeting and signed off on the minutes they prepared. It was
improper to find, as a matter of law, and given the record evidence to refute that finding,
that Mr. Rudd "analyzed and reviewed all material facts."
CONCLUSION
The parties and the trial court were bound by the Utah Supreme Court's remand
directive for a fairness hearing. The procurement and judicial recognition of new waivers
violated the letter and spirit of the mandate. Even so, the post-remand waivers are
contaminated by the same problem as the 2005 Waivers: the participation of Greg
Schenk.
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Attorneys for Defendants
Cookietree, Inc. and Greg Schenk
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SAMUEL R. McLAUGHLIN et al.,
Plaintiffs,

I

[PROPOSED] RULING AND ORDER
Case Nos.: 040924997, 050906729
(consolidated)

v.
Judge: Anthony Quinn
GREG SCHENK et al,
Defendants.

THIS MATTER came before the Court on Defendants Greg Schenk and Cookietree,
Inc.'s ("Cookietree") Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Fairness of 2005 Waivers (the
"Motion"). Defendants Anna Schenk and the Estate of Boyd Schenk (the "Estate") joined in the
Motion. The Court has considered the materials submitted in support of and in opposition to the
Motion, including the Motion itself and all supporting materials; Anna Schenk and the Estate's
joinder; Plaintiff Samuel R. McLaughlin's ("McLaughlin") opposition and supporting materials;
Greg Schenk and Cookietree's reply memorandum and supporting materials; and the record and
file herein. In addition, the Court heard argument of counsel on October 18, 201L
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BACKGROUND
1.

On August 16, 1999, the Estate (administered by Anna Schenk) sold 545,200

shares of Cookietree common stock to Greg Schenk pursuant to a Stock Purchase and Sale
Agreement (the "Stock Sale"). {See August 19, 1999 Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement,
attached to the Affidavit of Harold Rosemann (the "Rosemann Aff") (Ex. 1 to the Motion) as
Ex.6.)
2.

In November 2004, McLaughlin, a minority shareholder and former employee of

Cookietree, commenced the instant lawsuit, in which he alleged, among other things, that the
Stock Sale was made in violation of a 1991 agreement among Cookietree and certain of its
shareholders (the "1991 Shareholders' Agreement") that placed certain restrictions on the sale or
transfer of Cookietree common stock (the "Transfer Restriction Provisions"). {See Compl., on
file herein.)
3.

On May 17, 2005, Cookietree's Board of Directors (the "Board") (consisting of

Greg Schenk, Cookietree's President; his wife, Gayle Schenk; and Harold Rosemann,
Cookietree's Treasurer) adopted a resolution by means of a unanimous written consent of the
members of the Board that waived the Transfer Restriction Provisions of the 1991 Shareholders'
Agreement to the Stock Sale (the "2005 Board Waiver"). {See 2005 Board Waiver, attached to
the Rosemann Aff. as Ex. 8.)
4.

On the same day, the then owners of more than two-thirds of the shares of the

common stock of Cookietree subject to the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement (excluding the shares
at issue in the Stock Sale) executed a Waiver and Consent that waived the Transfer Restriction
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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)

Provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement to the Stock Sale (the "2005 Shareholders'
Waiver"). (See 2005 Shareholders' Waiver, attached to the Rosemann Aff. as Ex. 9.) The 2005
Board and Shareholders' Waivers are collectively referred to as the "2005 Waivers."
5.

In the Utah Supreme Court's decision in this matter, McLaughlin v. Schenk, 2009

UT 64, 220 P.3d 146, the Supreme Court affirmed all of this Court's prior rulings dismissing
McLaughlin's claims against defendants, with one exception: the Court determined that the
2005 Waivers "were tainted by a conflict of interest because they were both executed by Greg
Schenck, who clearly had an economic interest in waiving the [Transfer Restriction Provisions]."
A/438.
6.

Because the 2005 Waivers did not entail a "transaction" by or with Cookietree,

and therefore were not subject to the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act (the "Corporation
Act"), id. U 35, the Utah Supreme Court adopted new procedures for dealing with
"nontransaction-related conflict situations." Id. f 37.
7.

Specifically, the Utah Supreme Court determined that a nontransaction-related

conflict situation may be resolved via any one of the three options set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§ 16-10a-851: (1) disinterested board members may vote to ratify the nontransaction-related
conflict situation, (2) disinterested shareholders may vote to ratify the nontransaction-related
conflict situation, or (3) the party with a conflict may show that the nontransaction-related
conflict situation was fair. See id. ("The procedures provided in the conflict of interest statute
most appropriately address nontransaction-related conflict situations because they do not
automatically invalidate conflict of interest transactions but instead require the party with a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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conflict to show the transaction was fair, or require the vote of disinterested board members or
disinterested shareholders to ratify the transaction." (citing Utah Code Ann. §16-1 Oa-851
(2005))). "In adopting these procedures for nontransaction-related conflicts, [the Utah Supreme
Court] recognize[d] that many aspects of corporate governance are unfair." Id.
8.

The Utah Supreme Court then "remand[ed] for a determination of whether the

[2005 Waivers] were fair within the meaning of Utah Code section 16-1 Oa-851, which is a factintensive inquiry focusing on whether the [2005] [W]aivers were beneficial to the corporation
and the shareholders and whether they satisfied the standard of fair dealing." Id. f 38.
9.

Following the McLaughlin decision, each of Cookietree's current Board and

shareholders took action to ratify the 2005 Waivers, and thus cure the nontransaction-related
conflict situation, in accordance with the new framework adopted in the McLaughlin decision.
10.

On December 18,2009, Cookietree held a meeting of its Board. At that time, the

Board members were Greg Schenk, Cookietree's President; Harold Rosemann, Cookietree's
Chief Financial Officer; and David Rudd, who is not (and never has been) employed by
Cookietree. Prior to the meeting, David Rudd analyzed and reviewed documentation containing
all of the material facts concerning the Stock Sale and the 2005 Waivers, including, but not
limited to, the 2005 Waivers themselves, the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, Cookietree's
financial statements and other financial information, and the McLaughlin decision.
11.

At the meeting, David Rudd, as the sole disinterested or "qualified" member of

the Board, after full disclosure by Greg Schenk, adopted the following resolutions:
(a)

ratification of the 2005 Board Waiver (the "2009 Board Ratification"); and
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(b)

o

present waiver of the Transfer Restriction Provisions to the Stock Sale.

(See Board Minutes (Dec. 18, 2009) at 2, attached to the Rosemann Aff. as Ex. 11.)
12.

After David Rudd took the foregoing actions on behalf of Cookietree, all three

Board members then voted to set the time and place of the annual shareholders' meeting and
resolved that the matters of business to come before the shareholders included, among other
things:
(a)

the present waiver by the shareholders of the Transfer Restriction Provisions to
the Stock Sale ("Proposal 1"); and

(b)

ratification of the 2005 Shareholders' Waiver and the current shareholders'
waiver contemplated in Proposal 1 ("Proposal 2").

(See id. at 2-3.)
13.

On December 21, 2009, Cookietree's corporate secretary (Harold Rosemann) sent

all of the shareholders of Cookietree a notice of the 2009 annual shareholders' meeting (which
was to be held on January 6, 2010), an information statement concerning Proposals 1 and 2 (the
"Disclosure Statement"), and a proxy. (The notice, Disclosure Statement, and proxy are attached
to the Rosemann Aff. as Ex. 12.)
14.

The Disclosure Statement fully disclosed all material facts concerning the 1991

Shareholders' Agreement, the Transfer Restriction Provisions, the Stock Sale, the 2005 Waivers,
Greg Schenk's conflict of interest and the circumstances surrounding this litigation, and the Utah
Supreme Court's McLaughlin decision. (See Disclosure Statement at 1-6.) A copy of the
McLaughlin decision was enclosed with the Disclosure Statement.
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15.

At the 2009 shareholders' meeting, shareholders owning 4,113,400 shares of the

common stock of Cookietree were present, in person or by proxy, out of the 4,124,650 shares
issued, outstanding, and entitled to vote at the meeting. With respect to Proposal 1—to presently
waive the Transfer Restriction Provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement to the Stock
Sale—3,168,200 shares were voted in favor of the proposal and 400,000 shares (owned by the
McLaughlins) were voted against. This 3,168,200 did not include the shares at issue in the Stock
Sale, but did include Greg Schenk's remaining shares, pursuant to the waiver requirements of the
1991 Shareholders' Agreement. The Inspector of Election/Voting Judge (Harold Rosemann)
also announced at the meeting that 987,000 "qualified shares" (shares excluding all those owned
by Greg Schenk) were voted in favor of Proposal 1 and 400,000 "qualified shares" (owned by the
McLaughlins) were voted against Proposal 1. It was thus resolved that the shareholders
presently waived the Transfer Restriction Provisions to the Stock Sale (the "2009 Shareholders'
Waiver"). {See Shareholder Minutes at 1, attached to the Rosemann Aff. as Ex. 13; Certificate
and Report of Inspector of Election/Voting Judge ("Certificate of Voting") at 2-3, attached to the
Rosemann Aff. as Ex. 14.)
16.

With respect to Proposal 2—to ratify the 2005 Shareholders' Waiver and the 2009

Shareholders' Waiver—987,000 "qualified shares" (shares excluding all those owned by Greg
Schenk) were voted in favor of Proposal 2 and 400,000 "qualified shares" (owned by the
McLaughlins) were voted against Proposal 2. It was noted at the meeting that Greg Schenk did
not vote on Proposal 2. It was thus resolved that the owners of a majority of the disinterested or
"qualified" shares ratified (1) the 2005 Shareholders' Waiver; and (2) the 2009 Shareholders'
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Waiver (the "2009 Shareholders' Ratification"). (See Shareholder Minutes at 4; Certificate of
Voting at 7.) The 2009 Board and Shareholders' Ratifications are collectively referred to as the
"2009 Ratifications."
17.

On June 30, 2011, Greg Schenk and Cookietree filed the instant Motion. In the

Motion, Greg Schenk and Cookietree argued that, as a result of the 2009 Ratifications, a judicial
determination regarding the fairness of the 2005 Waivers is unnecessary, because the 2009
Ratifications effectively resolved the nontransaction-related conflict situation identified by the
Utah Supreme Court in McLaughlin. Greg Schenk and Cookietree further argued that to the
extent a judicial determination of fairness vis-a-vis the 2005 Waivers is required, based upon the
undisputed facts, the 2005 Waivers were fair to Cookietree and its shareholders as a matter of
law. As noted above, Anna Schenk and the Estate joined in the Motion.
RULING AND ORDER
At the outset, the Court considered whether it has the discretion to consider avenues other
than a fairness hearing under the McLaughlin decision and Section 16-10a-851 of the
Corporation Act—i.e., a vote of disinterested directors and/or shareholders—for resolving a
nontransation-related conflict situation. The Court believes that the Utah Supreme Court did not
address this question in McLaughlin, as it could only address the dispute before it. Further,
nowhere in the McLaughlin decision did the Utah Supreme Court prohibit Cookietree's
disinterested Board member and/or disinterested shareholders from taking action anew pursuant
to Section 16-10a-851 of the Corporation Act to resolve Greg Schenk's conflict of interest, nor
does the McLaughlin decision explain why such action would be unavailable in this case. For
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these reasons, the Court concludes that it has the discretion to consider other avenues for
resolving the nontransation-related conflict inherent in the 2005 Waivers, namely the 2009
Ratifications.
With regard to the 2009 Ratifications, the Court concludes that there is no material
question of fact concerning the circumstances surrounding the 2009 Ratifications, or the content
of disclosures made to David Rudd and the shareholders in connection therewith. As such, the
Court has concluded that it may decide the validity of the 2009 Ratifications—and whether they
effectively resolved the nontransaction-related conflict situation at issue—at the summary
judgment stage.
The Court concludes that the 2009 Ratifications complied with the framework for
resolving nontransaction-related conflict situations set forth in the McLaughlin decision and
Section 16-10a-851 of the Corporation Act, and thus completely resolved Greg Schenk's conflict
of interest vis-a-vis the 2005 Waivers. Greg Schenk made required disclosure to David Rudd
and the shareholders prior to the 2009 Ratifications. Further, the 2009 Board Ratification was
made by a "qualified" Board (made up of one disinterested or "qualified" member, David Rudd),
and the 2009 Shareholders' Ratification was likewise made by a majority of the disinterested or
"qualified" shareholders of Cookietree, whether or not Greg Schenk's and Harold Rosemann's
shares were counted. Importantly, however, in accordance with the McLaughlin decision, Greg
Schenk did not vote any of his shares on the proposal to ratify the 2005 Shareholders' Waiver.
As a matter of law, then, the Court concludes that such actions have completely resolved Greg
Schenk's conflict of interest vis-a-vis the 2005 Waivers and rendered any fairness hearing (or
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other further proceedings in this case) moot. Indeed, the Corporation Act provides that if
directors' or shareholders' action is taken to ratify a conflicted transaction or "nontransaction"
(as is the case here), the "transaction may not be enjoined, be set aside, or give rise to an award
of damages or other sanctions" as a matter of law. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-851(2).
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:
1.

The Motion is hereby GRANTED insofar as the Court has concluded that the

2009 Ratifications effectively resolved Greg Schenk's conflict of interest vis-a-vis the 2005
Waivers as a matter of law (the Court has reached no conclusion regarding the fairness of the
2005 Waivers);
2.

All of McLaughlin's remaining claims against defendants Greg Schenk,

Cookietree, Anna Schenk, and the Estate are dismissed with prejudice and without recovery of
any kind; and
3.

The Court hereby directs the entry of final judgment of dismissal as to the

consolidated cases.
DATED this ^ 7 day of

7#t/lS

, 2011.
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